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Abstract. It is a common belief that computing a market equilibrium
in Fisher’s spending model is easier than computing a market equilib-
rium in Arrow-Debreu’s exchange model. This belief is built on the fact
that we have more algorithmic success in Fisher equilibria than Arrow-
Debreu equilibria. For example, a Fisher equilibrium in a Leontief market
can be found in polynomial time, while it is PPAD-hard to compute an
approximate Arrow-Debreu equilibrium in a Leontief market.
In this paper, we show that even when all the utilities are additively sep-
arable, piecewise-linear, and concave functions, finding an approximate
equilibrium in Fisher’s model is complete in PPAD. Our result solves
a long-term open question on the complexity of market equilibria. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first PPAD-completeness result for
Fisher’s model. 3
1 Introduction
1.1 Market Equilibria: Fisher’s Model vs Arrow-Debreu’s Model
In 1891, Irving Fisher introduced one of the most fundamental exchange market
models in his Ph.D. thesis [2]. It considers a market in which there are n buyers
and m divisible goods. We denote the amount of good j, j ∈ [m], in the market
by cj > 0. Every buyer i comes to the market with a certain amount of money,
denoted by wi > 0. The goal of a buyer is to obtain a bundle of goods, denoted
by ai ∈ R
m
+ , that maximizes her utility function ui : R
m
+ → R+.
Fisher showed that if all the utility functions ui satisfy some mild conditions,
then there always exists an equilibrium price vector p ∈ Rm+ . At this price, one
can find a bundle of goods ai for each buyer i such that ai maximizes her utility
under the budget constraint that
∑
j∈[m] ai,j · pj ≤ wi,
and at the same time, the market demands equal to the market supply:
∑
i∈[n] ai,j ≤ cj , for all j ∈ [m].
3 Recently, Vazirani and Yannakakis independently proved that the problem of com-
puting a Fisher equilibrium in a market with additively separable and PLC utility
functions is PPAD-complete [1].
Fisher’s model is a special case of the more general model of exchange eco-
nomies considered by Arrow and Debreu [3]: In an exchange economy, there are
n traders and m divisible goods. Trader i has an initial endowment of wi,j ≥ 0
of good j and a utility function ui : R
m
+ → R+. The individual goal of a trader
is to obtain a new bundle of goods that maximizes her utility.
In a sense, Fisher’s model focuses more on spending than trading as in Arr-
ow-Debreu’s model. In his model, money can be viewed as a special kind of good.
All but one “special” trader only have money as their endowments, and money
has no value to their utilities; the special trader, sometime called the “market”,
has all the goods and her interest is to collect all the money.
Over the last two decades, we have more algorithmic success in computing a
market equilibrium in Fisher’s model than computing an equilibrium in Arrow-
Debreu’s model.
– For the latter, polynomial-time algorithms are only known for markets with
utility functions that are linear [4–12] or satisfy weak gross substitutability
[13]. These algorithms critically used the fact that the set of equilibria of
these markets is convex. Progress on markets with non-convex set of equi-
libria has been relatively slow. There are only a few algorithms in this case.
Devanur and Kannan [14] gave a polynomial-time algorithm for markets with
piecewise-linear and concave (PLC) utilities and a constant number of goods.
Codenotti, McCune, Penumatcha, and Varadarajan [15] gave a polynomial-
time algorithm for CES markets when the elasticity of substitution s ≥ 1/2.
For Leontief markets, in which each utility function is of the form minj ajxj ,
computing an approximate Arrow-Debreu equilibrium price is known to be
PPAD-hard [16–18]. Recently, Chen et. al. [19] showed that finding an app-
roximate equilibrium in an Arrow-Debreu exchange market, even if all the
utility functions are additively separable 4 PLC, is complete in PPAD.
– For Fisher’s model, polynomial-time algorithms are given not only for linear
markets but also for Leontief and many other markets, e.g., the hybrid linear-
Leontief markets [20]. We know that an (approximate) market equilibrium
in any Fisher’s economy with CES utilities can be found in polynomial time
[4, 15, 12, 21, 7, 22]. In fact, Ye [21] proved that if every utility function is the
minimum of a collection of homogeneous linear functions, then one can find
a Fisher equilibrium in polynomial time.
1.2 Our Results
It remains open whether there is a family of concave utility functions for which
it is PPAD-hard to compute a Fisher equilibrium. The family of utility functions
that has drawn most attention is the additively separable, piecewise-linear, and
concave (PLC) functions. Vazirani [23] remarked that obtaining a polynomial-
time algorithm for markets with additively separable and concave utility func-
4 A function u(x1, . . . , xm) from R
m
+ to R+ is additively separable if there exist m real-
valued functions f1, . . . , fm such that u(x1, . . . , xm) =
Pm
j=1
fj(xj).
tions is a premier open question today. Although the recent result of Chen et.al.
[19] settled the complexity of computing an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium in mar-
kets with additively separable and PLC utilities, the complexity of Fisher equi-
libria remains unsettled.
In this paper, we show that the problem of finding a Fisher equilibrium re-
mains to be PPAD-complete when the utility functions are additively separable
and PLC. Therefore, for this seemingly simple class of utility functions, finding a
Fisher equilibrium is as hard as finding an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Recently,
Vazirani and Yannakakis independently proved that the problem of finding a
Fisher equilibrium in a market with additively separable and PLC utility func-
tions is PPAD-complete [1].
1.3 Sketch of the Proof
We prove the PPAD-hardness of computing a Fisher equilibrium by giving a re-
duction from Sparse Bimatrix [24]: the problem of computing an approximate
Nash equilibrium in a sparse two-player game (see Section 2.1 for definition).
Similar to [19], our reduction starts by constructing a family of marketsMn
for every n ≥ 1, which we refer to as the price-regulating markets. There are 2n
goods in Mn, and every approximate equilibrium price p satisfies the following
price-regulation property:
p2k−1 + p2k ≈ 3 and 1/2 ≤ p2k−1
/
p2k ≤ 2, for every k ∈ [n].
This allows us to encode n [0, 1]-variables x1, . . . , xn using p as
xk = p2k −
(
p2k + p2k+1
)/
3, for every k ∈ [n]. (1)
Moreover, the price-regulation property is stable with respect to “small pertur-
bations” to Mn: When new buyers are added to Mn (without introducing new
goods), this property remains to hold as long as the total amount of money of
these new buyers is small compared to that of the buyers in Mn. We remark
that the price-regulating markets Mn in this paper are different from those in
[19], simply because we are dealing with Fisher’s model. In particular, our family
{Mn} is piecewise-linear while the one in [19] is linear.
Given an n×n two-player game (A,B), we construct a marketM by adding
new buyers to M2n+1 (with 4n+ 2 goods). All the new buyers have very little
money compared to those inM2n+1 so the price-regulation property still holds.
This enables us to encode a pair of probability distributions (x,y) of dimension
n (with 2n variables) using the first 4n entries of the price vector p as in (1). By
using the price-regulation property we show how to set the utility functions of
the new buyers appropriately so that we can control their preferences over the
goods and ultimately implement all the Nash equilibrium constraints over (x,y)
through p. As a result, given any (approximate) market equilibrium price p of
M, the pair (x,y) obtained (after normalization) must be an approximate Nash
equilibrium of (A,B).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Complexity of Nash Equilibria
A two-player game is defined by the payoff matrices (A,B) of its two players.
In this paper, we assume that both players have n choices of actions and thus,
both A and B are square matrices with n rows and columns. We use ∆n ⊂ Rn
to denote the set of probability distributions of n dimensions.
We say a pair of probability vectors (x,y), where x ∈ ∆n and y ∈ ∆n, is a
Nash equilibrium of (A,B) if for all i and j in [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n},
Aiy
T > Ajy
T =⇒ xj = 0 and xBi > xBj =⇒ yj = 0,
where we use Ai to denote the ith row vector of A, and Bi to denote the ith
column vector of B, respectively. For ǫ > 0, (x,y) is an ǫ-well-supported Nash
equilibrium of (A,B), if x,y ∈ ∆n and for all i, j ∈ [n],
Aiy
T −Ajy
T > ǫ =⇒ xj = 0 and xBi − xBj > ǫ =⇒ yj = 0. (2)
A two-player game (A,B) is said to be normalized if every entry of A and
B is between −1 and 1. We say a two-player game (A,B) is sparse if every row
and every column of A and B have at most 10 nonzero entries.
Let Sparse Bimatrix denote the following search problem: given an n× n
sparse normalized two-player game, find an n−6-well-supported Nash equilibri-
um. By [24], we know that Sparse Bimatrix is PPAD-complete.
2.2 Markets with Additively Separable PLC Utilities
Let G = {G1, . . . , Gn} denote a set of n divisible goods, and T = {T1, . . . , Tm}
denote a set of buyers. For each good Gj , we use cj > 0 to denote the amount
of Gj in the market. For each buyer Ti, we use wi > 0 to denote her money and
ui : R
n
+ → R+ to denote her utility function. In this paper, we will mainly focus
on markets with additively separable, piecewise-linear and concave utilities.
A continuous function r(·) over R+ is said to be t-segment piecewise linear
and concave (PLC) if r(0) = 0 and there exists a tuple
[θ0 > θ1 > . . . > θt ≥ 0; 0 < a1 < a2 < . . . < at]
of length 2t+ 1 such that (letting a0 = 0)
1. ∀ i ∈ [0 : t− 1], the restriction of r(·) over [ai, ai+1] is a segment of slope θi;
2. the restriction of r(·) over [at,+∞) is a ray of slope θt.
The (2t+1)-tuple is called the representation of r(·). Also we say r(·) is strictly
monotone if θt > 0, and is α-bounded for some α ≥ 1 if α ≥ θ0 and θt ≥ 1.
Definition 1. A function u(·) : Rn+ → R+ is said to be an additively separable
PLC function if there exist PLC functions r1(·), . . . , rn(·) : R+ → R+ such that
u(a) =
∑
j∈[n] rj(aj), for all a ∈ R
n
+.
In such a market, we use, for each buyer Ti ∈ T , ri,j(·) : R+ → R+ to denote
her PLC function with respect to good Gj ∈ G. As a result, we have
ui(a) =
∑
j∈[n] ri,j(aj), for all a ∈ R
n
+.
We use p ∈ Rn+ to denote a price vector, where p 6= 0 and pj is the price of Gj .
Given p, we let OPT(i,p) denote the set of allocations that maximize ui(·):
OPT(i,p) = argmax
a∈Rn
+
, a·p≤wi
ui(a).
We let X = {ai ∈ R
n
+ : i ∈ [m]} denote an allocation of the market: for each
buyer Ti ∈ T , ai ∈ R
n
+ is the amount of goods that Ti receives. In particular,
the amount of Gj that Ti receives in X is ai,j .
Definition 2. A market equilibrium is a nonzero vector p ∈ Rn+ such that there
exists an allocation X = {ai : i ∈ [m]} which has the following two properties:
1. Every buyer gets an optimal bundle: for every Ti, ai ∈ OPT(i,p);
2. The market clears: for every Gj ∈ G,
∑
i∈[m] ai,j ≤ cj. In particular,
pj > 0 =⇒
∑
i∈[m] ai,j = cj .
In general, not every market M has such an equilibrium price vector. How-
ever, for the additively separable PLC markets, the following condition guaran-
tees the existence of an equilibrium:
If for every buyer Ti ∈ T there exists a good Gj ∈ G such that the PLC
function ri,j(·) is strictly monotone, then a market equilibrium p exists.
It is a corollary of Maxfield [25]. Moreover, one can show that (e.g., see [14, 19])
if all the parameters of M are rational numbers, then it must have a rational
equilibrium p, and the number of bits needed to describe p is polynomial in the
input size of M (i.e., the number of bits we need to describe the market M).
We are interested in the problem of finding an approximate market equilib-
rium in an additively separable PLC market.
Definition 3 (Approximate Market Equilibrium). Let M be an additively
separable PLC market. We say p is an ǫ-approximate market equilibrium of M,
for some ǫ ≥ 0, if there is an allocation X = {ai ∈ R
n
+ : i ∈ [m]} such that every
buyer gets an optimal bundle with respect to p: ai ∈ OPT(i,p), for all i ∈ [m];
and the market clears approximately: for all Gj ∈ G,∣∣∣∑i∈[m] ai,j − cj
∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ · cj .
We make some further restrictions on the markets we are interested in. We
say an additively separable PLC marketM is α-bounded, for some α ≥ 1, if for
all Ti and Gj , the PLC function ri,j(·) is either the zero function or α-bounded.
We call an additively separable PLC market M a 2-linear market, if for all Ti
and Gj , ri,j(·) has at most two segments. Finally we say an additively separable
PLC marketM is t-sparse, for some positive integer t, if for any Ti, the number
of j ∈ [n] such that ri,j(·) is not the zero function is at most t. In another word,
every buyer Ti is interested in at most t goods.
We use Fisher to denote the following search problem: given a 2-linear ad-
ditively separable PLC marketM, which is 81-bounded, 43-sparse and satisfies
the condition of Maxfield, find an n−21-approximate market equilibrium, where
n denotes the number of goods in the market. It is not hard to show that Fisher
is in PPAD (e.g., see [19]). The main result of the paper is to show that Fisher
is actually PPAD-complete.
Theorem 1 (Main). Fisher is PPAD-complete.
3 A Price-Regulating Market
In this section, we construct a family of price-regulating markets {Mn : n ≥ 1}
in Fisher’s setting. For every positive integer n,Mn has n buyers, 2n goods and
satisfies the following price regulation property.
Property 1 (Price Regulation). Let p ∈ R2n+ be an ǫ-approximate equilibrium
of Mn with ǫ < 1, then we have
3
1 + ǫ
≤ p2k−1 + p2k ≤
3
1− ǫ
and
1
2
≤
p2k−1
p2k
≤ 2, for every k ∈ [n].
We start with some notation. The goods in Mn are G = {G1, . . . , G2n} and
the buyers in Mn are T = {T1, . . . , Tn}. For each buyer Ti ∈ T , we use wi > 0
to denote her money, ui(·) to denote her utility function, ri,k(·) to denote her
PLC function with respect to Gk, and OPT(i,p) to denote the set of bundles
that maximize her utility with respect to p.
In the construction of Mn below, we use r(·) ⇐ [θ] to denote the action of
setting r(·) to be the linear function of slope θ ≥ 0; and use r(·)⇐ [θ0, θ1; a1] to
denote the action of setting it to be the 2-segment function with representation
[θ0, θ1; a1], where θ0 > θ1 and a1 > 0.
Construction of Mn: First, we set ck = 1 for all k ∈ [2n]. Second, for every
i ∈ [n], we set wi = 3. Finally, we set the PLC functions ri,k(·) as follows:
1. For all k 6= 2i− 1, 2i, we set ri,k(·) to be the zero function: ri,k(·)⇐ [0];
2. ri,2i−1(·)⇐ [2]; and ri,2i(·)⇐ [4, 1; 1].
This finishes the construction ofMn (which is 2-linear, 4-bounded and 2-sparse).
Proof (Proof of Property 1). Let p be an ǫ-approximate equilibrium, and X =
{ai ∈ R
2n
+ : i ∈ [n]} be an optimal allocation that clears the market approxima-
tely. Without loss of generality, we prove Property 1 for k = 1.
First, it is easy to check that p1, p2 > 0 since otherwise, we have a1,1 = +∞
or a1,2 = +∞, which contradicts the assumption of p being an ǫ-approximate
market equilibrium.
Second, we show that p1/p2 ≤ 2. Assume, for contradiction, that p1 > 2 · p2.
By the optimality of a1, we have a1,1 = 0. As a result, we have ai,1 = 0 for all
i ∈ [n], which contradicts the assumption that p is an approximate equilibrium.
Similarly, one can show that p1/p2 ≥ 1/2.
Finally, by the optimality of a1, we have 3 = a1,1 · p1+ a1,2 · p2. Since p is an
ǫ-approximate market equilibrium, we have |a1,1 − 1|, |a1,2 − 1| ≤ ǫ. As a result,
(1− ǫ)(p1 + p2) ≤ 3 = a1,1 · p1 + a1,2 · p2 ≤ (1 + ǫ)(p1 + p2)
and Lemma 1 follows.
By Lemma 1, we have
p2k−1, p2k ∈
[
p2k−1 + p2k
3
,
2(p2k−1 + p2k)
3
]
⊂
[
1
1 + ǫ
,
2
1− ǫ
]
.
In the next section, we use M2n+1 and the following 2n variables derived from
p to encode a pair of n-dimensional distributions (x,y): For k ∈ [n],
xk = p2k −
(
p2k−1 + p2k
)/
3 and yk = p2(n+k) −
(
p2(n+k)−1 + p2(n+k)
)/
3.
Given an n×n sparse two-player game (A,B), we show how to add new buyers
to “perturb” the market M2n+1 so that any approximate equilibrium p of the
new market yields an approximate Nash equilibrium (x,y) of (A,B).
4 Reduction from Sparse Bimatrix to Fisher
In this section we prove Theorem 1 by giving a polynomial-time reduction from
Sparse Bimatrix to Fisher. Given an n × n sparse two-player game (A,B),
where A,B ∈ [−1, 1]n×n, we build an additively separable PLC market M by
adding more buyers to the price-regulating market M2n+1. There are 4n + 2
goods G = {G1, . . . , G4n, G4n+1, G4n+2} in M, and the buyers T in M are
T =
{
Ti, Tu, Tv : i ∈ [2n+ 1],u ∈ U and v ∈ V
}
,
where U = {(i, j, 1) : 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n} and V = {(i, j, 2) : 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n}. The
buyers {Ti} have almost the same money and PLC functions as in M2n+1.
When constructing the marketM, we also define a 4n-dimensional vector su
for every buyer Tu, and a 4n-dimensional vector sv for every buyer Tv, which
will be useful in the proof of correctness.
4.1 Setting up the Market M
First, we set the money and utility function of each buyer T ∈ T .
Buyers Ti, where i ∈ [2n+ 1]. For every Ti ∈ T , where i ∈ [2n+ 1], we set
her money wi and PLC functions ri,k(·) almost the same as inM2n+1. First we
set wi = 3. Second, the PLC function ri,k(·) is set as:
1. ri,k(·)⇐ [0] for all k 6= 2i− 1, 2i; and
2. ri,2i−1(·)⇐ [2]; and ri,2i(·)⇐ [4, 1; 1 + 1/n
20].
Buyers Tu, where u ∈ U . Let u = (i, j, 1), where 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n. We use Ai
and Aj to denote the ith and jth row vectors of A, respectively, and use C to
denote Ai−Aj . Because A ∈ [−1, 1]
n×n, |Ck| ≤ 2 for all k. We denote by m the
number of nonzero entries in C, then it is clear that m ≤ 20. Let C =
∑
k∈[n] Ck
then we have |C| ≤ 20.
First, we set the money wu of Tu to be
wu =
3
n12
+
6m+ C
n13
.
Using C, we set the PLC functions ru,k(·), where k ∈ [4n+ 2], of Tu as follows:
1. ru,2(n+k)−1(·)⇐ [0] and ru,2(n+k)(·)⇐ [0] for all k ∈ [n] such that Ck = 0;
2. ru,2(n+k)−1(·)⇐ [81, 1; 2/n
13] for all k ∈ [n] such that Ck 6= 0;
3. ru,2(n+k)(·)⇐ [81, 1; (2 + Ck)/n
13] for all k ∈ [n] such that Ck 6= 0;
4. ru,2j−1(·)⇐ [27, 1; 1/n
12] and ru,2j(·)⇐ [9, 1; 1/n
12];
5. ru,k(·)⇐ [0] for all other k ∈ [2n];
6. ru,4n+1(·)⇐ [3] and ru,4n+2(·)⇐ [0].
We also define the auxiliary vector su ∈ R
4n
+ as follows:
1. su,2(n+k)−1 = su,2(n+k) = 0 for all k ∈ [n] such that Ck = 0;
2. su,2(n+k)−1 = 2/n
13 and su,2(n+k) = (2 + Ck)/n
13 for all k with Ck 6= 0;
3. su,2j−1 = su,2j = 1/n
12; and
4. su,k = 0 for all other k ∈ [2n].
Buyers Tv, where v ∈ V . The behavior of Tv, v ∈ V , is similar to that of Tu
except that it works on the second payoff matrix B.
Let v = (i, j, 2) ∈ V , where 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n. We let Bi and Bj denote the ith
and jth column vectors of B, respectively, and use C to denote Bi−Bj . We also
use m to denote the number of nonzero entries in C and C to denote
∑
k∈[n] Ck.
First, we set the money wv > 0 of Tv to be
wv =
3
n12
+
6m+ C
n13
.
Using C, we set the utility functions rv,k(·), where k ∈ [4n+2], of Tv as follows:
1. rv,2k−1(·)⇐ [0] and rv,2k(·)⇐ [0] for all k ∈ [n] such that Ck = 0;
2. rv,2k−1(·)⇐ [81, 1; 2/n
13] for all k ∈ [n] such that Ck 6= 0;
3. rv,2k(·)⇐ [81, 1; (2 + Ck)/n
13] for all k ∈ [n] such that Ck 6= 0;
4. rv,2(n+j)−1(·)⇐ [27, 1; 1/n
12] and rv,2(n+j)(·)⇐ [9, 1; 1/n
12];
5. rv,k(·)⇐ [0] for all other k ∈ [2n : 4n];
6. rv,4n+1(·)⇐ [3] and rv,4n+2(·)⇐ [0].
Similarly, we define the auxiliary vector sv ∈ R
4n
+ as follows:
1. sv,2k−1 = sv,2k = 0 for all k ∈ [n] such that Ck = 0;
2. sv,2k−1 = 2/n
13 and sv,2k = (2 + Ck)/n
13 for all k ∈ [n] such that Ck 6= 0;
3. sv,2(n+j)−1 = sv,2(n+j) = 1/n
12; and
4. sv,k = 0 for all other k ∈ [2n : 4n].
Setting ck, where k ∈ [4n+ 2]. First, c4n+1 = c4n+2 = 1. Second, we set
ck = 1 +
∑
u∈U su,k +
∑
v∈V sv,k, for every k ∈ [4n],
using the auxiliary vectors su and sv. This finishes the construction of M. It is
easy to check that the marketM constructed is 2-linear, 81-bounded, 43-sparse,
and satisfies the condition of Maxfield.
4.2 Sketch of the Reduction
Let N = 4n+ 2, the number of goods in M. Then to prove Theorem 1, we only
need to show that from every N−21-approximate equilibrium p of M, one can
construct an n−6-well-supported equilibrium (x,y) of (A,B) efficiently.
To this end, we let (x′,y′) denote the following two n-dimensional vectors:
x′k = p2k −
p2k−1 + p2k
3
and y′k = p2(n+k) −
p2(n+k)−1 + p2(n+k)
3
. (3)
Then we normalize (x′,y′) to get (x,y) (we will show later that x′,y′ 6= 0):
xk =
x′k∑
i∈[n] x
′
i
and yk =
y′k∑
i∈[n] y
′
i
, for every k ∈ [n]. (4)
Theorem 1 then follows from Theorem 2 below, which we will prove in the next
section. Note that if p is an N−21-approximate equilibrium, then by definition
it is also an n−21-approximate equilibrium.
Theorem 2. If p is an n−21-approximate market equilibrium of M, then (x,y)
constructed above must be an n−6-well-supported Nash equilibrium of (A,B).
5 Correctness of the Reduction
In this section, we prove Theorem 2. Let p = (p1, . . . , p4n+2) be an n
−21-appro-
ximate equilibrium of M. It is easy to show that pk > 0 for all k. Let X be an
optimal allocation with respect to p that clears the market approximately:
X =
{
ai, au, av ∈ R
4n+2
+ : i ∈ [2n+ 1],u ∈ U and v ∈ V
}
.
We start with some notation. We let
T ∗ =
{
Ti : i ∈ [2n+ 1]
}
, TU =
{
Tu : u ∈ U
}
and TV =
{
Tv : v ∈ V
}
.
Let T ′ ⊆ T be a subset of buyers and k ∈ [4n+2], then we use ak[T
′] to denote
the amount of good Gk that buyers in T
′ receive in the final allocation X . For
T ′ ⊆ TU ∪ TV and k ∈ [4n], we let
sk[T
′] =
∑
Tu∈T ′∩TU
su,k +
∑
Tv∈T ′∩TV
sv,k.
By the construction of M, we have c4n+1 = c4n+2 = 1 and
1 < ck = 1 +Θ(1/n
11) < 2, for every k ∈ [4n].
By the definition of approximate equilibria, |ck − ak[T ]| ≤ ck/n
21 < 2/n21 and
∣∣sk[Tu ∪ Tv]− ak[Tu ∪ Tv] + 1− ak[T ∗] ∣∣ < 2/n21, for all k ∈ [4n]. (5)
5.1 The Price-Regulation Property
First we show that the price vector p must satisfy the following price-regulation
property. The proof is similar to that of Property 1, which mainly uses the fact
that buyers in T ∗ possess almost all the money in the market M.
Lemma 1 (Price Regulation). For every k ∈ [2n+ 1], we have
1
2
≤
p2k−1
p2k
≤ 2 and 3−O
(
1
n11
)
≤ p2k−1 + p2k ≤ 3 +O
(
1
n10
)
.
Proof. We start with the second part of the lemma.
First, the total money that buyers in T spend on G2k−1 and G2k is
p2k−1 · a2k−1[T ] + p2k · a2k[T ] ≤ 3 +O(1/n
12) · (|U |+ |V |) = 3 +O(1/n10) (6)
since buyers Ti, i 6= k, are not interested in G2k−1 and G2k. On the other hand,
because p is an approximate equilibrium, we have
a2k−1[T ] ≥ c2k−1 · (1− 1/n
21) ≥ 1− 1/n21 and a2k[T ] ≥ 1− 1/n
21.
As a result,
p2k−1 · a2k−1[T ] + p2k · a2k[T ] ≥ (p2k−1 + p2k)(1 − 1/n
21). (7)
By combining (6) and (7), we have p2k−1 + p2k ≤ 3 +O(1/n
10).
Second, by the optimality of ak, we have
3 = p2k−1 · ak,2k−1 + p2k · ak,2k. (8)
On the other hand, because p is an approximate equilibrium, we have
ak,2k−1 ≤ a2k−1[T ] ≤ c2k−1(1 + 1/n
21) = 1 +O(1/n11)
and ak,2k ≤ 1 +O(1/n
11). As a result,
p2k−1 · ak,2k−1 + p2k · ak,2k ≤ (p2k−1 + p2k)
(
1 +O(1/n11)
)
. (9)
By combining (8) and (9), we have p2k−1 + p2k ≥ 3−O(1/n
11).
Finally we prove the first part of the lemma. Assume, for contradiction, that
p2k−1 > 2 · p2k for some k ∈ [2n+ 1]. By the optimality of ak, ak,2k−1 = 0 and
thus, the money that buyers in T spend on G2k−1 is at most
O(1/n12) · (|U |+ |V |) = O(1/n10).
However, since p2k−1 > 2 · p2k, the price of G2k−1 is at least
2(p2k−1 + p2k)
/
3 ≥ 2−O(1/n11),
which contradicts the assumption that p is an approximate equilibrium of M.
Similarly, one can show that p2k ≤ 2 · p2k−1, and the lemma is proven.
Corollary 1. For all i, j ∈ [4n+ 2], we have pi/pj < 3.
Using Corollary 1, we analyze the behavior of Tu and Tv as follows.
Behavior of Tu: Let u = (i, j, 1) ∈ U , where 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n. Let C = Ai −Aj ,
m ≤ 20 be the number of nonzero entries in C and C =
∑
k∈[n] Ck. By Corollary
1 and the optimality of au, Tu first buys the following bundle of goods:
{
su,2(n+k)−1 of G2(n+k)−1 and su,2(n+k) of G2(n+k) : k ∈ [n] and Ck 6= 0
}
. (10)
The money of Tu left is (we let I denote the set of k ∈ [n] such that Ck 6= 0)
3
n12
+
6m+ C
n13
−
2
n13
∑
k∈I
(
p2(n+k)−1 + p2(n+k)
)
−
1
n13
∑
k∈I
Ck · p2(n+k). (11)
By Lemma 1, the money left is 3/n12−O(1/n13) > 0. After this, Tu buys G2j−1
up to 1/n12 and the money left is Ω(1/n12) by Lemma 1. Finally, Tu buys G2j
up to 1/n12 and spends all the money left, if any, to buy G4n+1.
Behavior of Tv: Let v = (i, j, 2) ∈ V , where 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n. Let C = Bi −Bj ,
m ≤ 20 be the number of nonzero entries in C and C =
∑
k∈[n] Ck. By Corollary
1 and the optimality of av, Tv first buys the following bundle of goods
{
sv,2k−1 of G2k−1 and sv,2k of G2k : k ∈ [n] with Ck 6= 0
}
.
The money of Tv left is (we let I denote the set of k ∈ [n] such that Ck 6= 0)
3
n12
+
6m+ C
n13
−
2
n13
∑
k∈I
(
p2k−1 + p2k
)
−
1
n13
∑
k∈I
Ck · p2k. (12)
By Lemma 1 the money left is 3/n12−O(1/n13). After this, Tv buys G2(n+j)−1
up to 1/n12 and the money left is Ω(1/n12). Finally, Tv buys good G2(n+j) up
to 1/n12 and spends all the money left, if any, on G4n+1.
The analysis above gives us the following corollary.
Corollary 2. For all k ∈ [2n], a2k−1[TU ∪ TV ] = s2k−1[TU ∪ TV ]. For all T ∈
TU ∪ TV and k ∈ [2n], we have a2k[T ] ≤ s2k[T ]. In particular,
s2k[TU ∪ TV ]− a2k[TU ∪ TV ] ≥ s2k[T ]− a2k[T ], for any T ∈ TU ∪ TV .
For all k ∈ [n], we have s2k[TV ] = a2k[TV ] and s2(n+k)[TU ] = a2(n+k)[TU ].
By combining (5) and the first part of Corollary 2, we have,
∣∣ak,2k−1 − 1∣∣ < 2/n21, for every k ∈ [2n]. (13)
5.2 Two Useful Lemmas
We prove two useful relations between p2k and s2k[TU ∪ TV ]− a2k[TU ∪ TV ].
Lemma 2. Let p be an n−21-approximate market equilibrium of M. If
s2k[TU ∪ TV ]− a2k[TU ∪ TV ] = Ω(1/n
19) (14)
for some k ∈ [2n], then p2k = (p2k−1 + p2k)/3.
Proof. Assume (14) holds for some k ∈ [2n]. Then by (5) we have a2k[T
∗]− 1 =
Ω(1/n19) and thus, a2k[T
∗] > 1 + 1/n20. This implies that ak,2k > 1 + 1/n
20.
By (13) and the optimality of ak, we have p2k−1/2 = p2k/1.
Lemma 3. Let p be an n−21-approximate market equilibrium. If
s2k[TU ∪ TV ]− a2k[TU ∪ TV ] = O(1/n
21)
for some k ∈ [2n], then p2k = 2(p2k−1 + p2k)/3.
Proof. Assume (14) holds for some k ∈ [2n]. Then by (5) we have a2k[T
∗]− 1 ≤
O(1/n21) and thus, a2k[T
∗] < 1 + 1/n20. This implies that ak,2k < 1 + 1/n
20.
By (13) and the optimality of ak, we have p2k−1/2 = p2k/4.
5.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Let x′ and y′ denote the two vectors obtained from p as in (3). By Lemma 1,
0 ≤ x′k, y
′
k ≤ 1 +O(1/n
10), for every k ∈ [n].
We state the following two lemmas and use them to prove Theorem 2.
Lemma 4. Let ǫ = n−6. Then for all i, j : 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n, we have
(Ai −Aj)y
′T > ǫ/2 =⇒ x′j = 0 and x
′(Bi −Bj) > ǫ/2 =⇒ y
′
j = 0, (15)
where Ai denotes the ith row of A and Bi denotes the ith column of B.
Lemma 5. There exist i and j ∈ [n] such that
x′i ≥ 1−O(1/n
11) and y′j ≥ 1−O(1/n
11).
Now assume that x′ and y′ satisfy both properties. In particular, Lemma 5
implies that x′,y′ 6= 0. Therefore, we can normalize them to get two probability
distributions x and y using (4). Before proving these two lemma, we use them
to show that (x,y) must be an ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium of (A,B).
Proof (Proof of Theorem 2). Since both x and y are probability distributions,
we only need to show that (x,y) satisfies (2) for all i, j : 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n. We only
prove the first part of (2) here. Assume Aiy
T −Ajy
T > ǫ, then
(Ai −Aj)y
′T = (Ai −Aj)y
T ·
∑
k∈[n] y
′
k >
(
1−O(1/n11)
)
ǫ > ǫ/2,
by Lemma 5. As a result, by Lemma 4 we have x′j = 0 and thus, xj = 0.
5.4 Proofs of Lemma 4 and Lemma 5
Proof (Proof of Lemma 4). Without loss of generality, we prove the first part of
(15) for the case when i = 1, j = 2. The other part can be proved similarly.
Let u = (1, 2, 1), C = A1 −A2, m be the number of non-zero entries in C,
and C =
∑
k∈[n] Ck. Assume (A1 −A2)y
′T > ǫ/2. Then the money of Tu left
after purchasing the bundle in (10) is given in (11). By the definition of y′k,
∑
k∈I
Ck · p2(n+k) =
1
3
∑
k∈I
Ck ·
(
p2(n+k)−1 + p2(n+k)
)
+ (A1 −A2)y
′T .
By Lemma 1, p2(n+k)−1 + p2(n+k) ≥ 3−O(1/n
11). So the money left is at most
3
n12
+
6m+ C
n13
−
1
n13
∑
k∈I
(
2 +
Ck
3
)(
3−O(1/n11)
)
−
ǫ
2n13
<
3
n12
−
1
2n19
+O
(
1
n24
)
.
After purchasing 1/n12 amount of G3, even if Tu spends all the money left
on G4, the amount of G4 she can get is at most
1
p4
(
3
n12
−Ω
(
1
n19
)
−
p3
n12
)
=
1
p4
(
3
n12
−
p3 + p4
n12
)
+
1
n12
−
1
p4
·Ω
(
1
n19
)
.
Since p3 + p4 ≥ 3−O(1/n
11), it is at most 1/n12 −Ω(1/n19). By Corollary 2,
s4[TU ∪ TV ]− a4[TU ∪ TV ] ≥ s4[Tu]− a4[Tu] ≥ Ω(1/n
19).
It then follows directly from Lemma 2 that x′2 = 0.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 5). Let k be one of the indices that maximize Aiy
′T :
Aky
′T = maxi Aiy
′T .
We will show p2k = 2(p2k−1 + p2k)/3 and then Lemma 5 follows from Lemma 1.
To this end, we bound s2k[TU ∪ TV ]− a2k[TU ∪ TV ]. By Corollary 2 we have
s2k[TV ] = a2k[TV ]. Now let u = (i, j, 1) be a triple in U with i 6= j. We consider
the following two cases.
First, if j 6= k, then su,2k = au,2k = 0.
Second, if j = k, then we use C to denote Ai−Ak, m to denote the number
of nonzero entries in C and C to denote
∑
ℓCℓ. The way we pick k guarantees
that Cy′T ≤ 0. After buying the bundle in (10), the money of Tu left is given in
(11). By the definition of y′k, it is at least
3
n12
+
6m+ C
n13
−
1
n13
∑
k∈I
(
2 +
Ck
3
)(
3 + O(1/n10)
)
=
3
n12
−O
(
1
n23
)
.
As a result, the amount of G2k that Tu gets is at least
1
p2k
(
3
n12
−O
(
1
n23
)
−
p2k−1
n12
)
=
1
p2k
(
3
n12
−
p2k−1 + p2k
n12
)
+
1
n12
−
1
p2k
· O
(
1
n23
)
≥ 1/n12 −O(1/n22).
Since the number of u ∈ U whose second component equals k is n− 1, we have
s2k[TU ]− a2k[TU ] ≤ O(1/n
21).
It then follows from Lemma 3 that p2k = 2(p2k−1 + p2k)/3.
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